Leaving Spaceship Europe: British space policy after Brexit by Bowen, Bleddyn
Leaving	Spaceship	Europe:	British	space	policy	after
Brexit
After	years	of	building	spacepower	for	Brussels,	London	seems	set	to	jettison	from	it	and	enter	the
unknown	of	commercial	life	in	space	outside	the	single	market	and	customs	union.	Bleddyn	Bowen
considers	the	costs	of	Britain	leaving	the	EU	while	the	latter	is	asserting	itself	as	an	independent	and
concrete	spacepower.
The	history	of	British	involvement	in	the	development	and	exploitation	of	outer	space	for	military,	economic,	political,
and	scientific	purposes	–	or	spacepower	–	is	largely	a	history	of	integration	and	alliance.	On	the	one	hand,	Britain
has	integrated	with	the	American	military	and	intelligence	space	networks	under	the	5	Eyes	agreement	and	the
‘special	relationship’.	On	the	other,	the	British	scientific	and	commercial	space	sectors	have	integrated	with	the
European	Space	Agency	and	the	EU’s	space	policies.
Space	is	a	strategic	environment	that	provides	military	advantages,	enables	economic	exploitation,	and	advances
technology	and	scientific	knowledge	which	benefits	life	on	Earth.	It	is	not	for	nothing	that	1,700	active	satellites	now
orbit	Earth.	In	the	so-called	Second	Space	Age,	outer	space	is	becoming	more	accessible	to	smaller	countries	due	to
the	decreasing	costs	of	rockets	and	satellite	manufacturing,	and	is	increasingly	commercial	in	its	character	rather
than	solely	funded	by	public	money.
Britain	is	well-placed	to	thrive	in	the	Second	Space	Age.	Lower	access	costs	to	space	through	new	commercial
launch	providers,	as	well	as	innovations	in	small	satellites	are	transforming	what	smaller	countries	can	do	in	space.
Britain’s	space	industry	is	a	leader	in	small	satellite	technologies.	New	innovations	in	surveillance	or	Earth
observation	small	satellites,	as	well	as	high-resolution	live	video	of	Earth’s	surface	from	space	show	that	Britain	can
deploy	affordable	and	cutting-edge	capabilities	that	may	be	of	interest	to	the	British	government.	British	investors
ranked	first	in	global	investment	in	the	space	economy	outside	the	United	States.
Leaving	Spaceship	Europe
However,	Britain’s	commercial,	industrial,	and	scientific	success	is	threatened	by	Brexit:	50%	of	satellite	exports	go
into	the	single	market,	and	construction	costs	are	kept	low	because	of	the	tariff-free	trade	to	import	and	export
components	among	the	EU’s	space	industry	which	is	dotted	across	the	continent.	The	EU’s	member	states	are	also
primed	to	benefit	from	the	Second	Space	Age	–	and	will	continue	to	receive	direct	EU	support	to	thrive.	Like	the	UK,
other	European	countries	are	developing	spaceports	and	small	satellite	launchers	but	will	remain	more	competitive
for	the	EU’s	satellite	manufacturers	within	the	customs	union	and	single	market.
On	a	more	political	note,	Britain	risks	losing	its	voice	in	shaping	the	strategic	direction	of	the	EU	as	a	space	power.
The	European	Space	Agency	(ESA)	is	increasingly	an	implementing	agency	of	EU	space	policy.	Though	the
European	Space	Agency	contains	members	outside	the	EU	and	is	nominally	outside	of	the	EU’s	governing
structures,	the	EU	is	ESA’s	single-largest	source	of	funding.	Outside	the	EU,	Britain	loses	influence	in	where	the
biggest	pots	of	money	within	ESA	are	going	to	be	apportioned.
British	spacepower	will	actually	be	threatened	by	the	EU’s	space	industrial	policy,	rather	than	supported	by	it	as	in
the	present.	The	policy	dictates	that	EU-funded	ESA	projects	must	be	contracted	to	EU	member	states	within	ESA,
and	requires	secure	and	privileged	access	to	their	data	and	services.
Brexit	takes	British	space	commerce	into	unknown	territory	due	to	the	fact	that	one	the	EU’s	flagship	space	projects
is	being	constructed	in	Britain:	the	Galileo	navigation	system.	Those	satellites	have	been	constructed	in	the	UK,	but
Brexit	has	already	cast	doubt	on	any	future	contracts	to	British-based	companies	and	factories,	and	Galileo	ground
stations	planned	for	Britain	have	already	been	moved	to	elsewhere	in	the	EU.	Furthermore,	there	is	the	possibility
that	the	Public	Regulated	Service	–	secure	military-grade	signals	from	Galileo	–	may	be	unavailable	to	Britain	once	it
leaves	the	EU.
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Whilst	members	of	ESA	that	are	within	the	customs	union	and	single	market	may	still	have	some	access	to	funds
and	services,	like	Norway	and	Switzerland,	the	government’s	signalling	still	suggests	Britain	does	not	seek	to	keep
this	level	of	access	to	the	single	market	and	customs	union.	This	means	Britain	may	have	to	go	it	alone	in	its
industrial	and	commercial	ventures	in	space,	as	well	as	relying	almost	entirely	on	American	or	bilateral	European
space	cooperation	on	the	military	side	of	space	capabilities.	Being	beholden	to	only	one	giant	of	space	power
reduces	British	military,	economic,	diplomatic,	and	political	flexibility	in	future.
Despite	the	special	relationship,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	America	will	provide	everything	Britain	requires	in	space.
Like	many	other	aspects	of	British	transatlantic	diplomacy,	the	British	voice	inside	the	EU	was	of	great	value	to
America	–	and	space	is	no	exception.
In	space,	no-one	can	hear	you	Brexit
Whilst	there	are	opportunities	for	Britain	to	develop	specific	capabilities	in	space	that	champions	its	own	successful
and	innovative	industry	–	such	as	Earth	observation/spy	satellites,	navigation,	and	space	tracking	–	this	will	cost
money	and	demand	public	investment.	Of	these,	Earth	observation	and	space	tracking	are	realistic	opportunities.
However,	the	UK	Space	Agency	is	currently	investigating	the	option	of	building	a	rival	system	to	Galileo.
Yet	price	tag	of	€10bn	for	Galileo	should	warrant	some	caution	on	whether	Britain	should	spend	so	much	to	duplicate
a	massive	space	infrastructure	that	will	compete	with	American	and	European	systems,	each	with	their	own
continent-wide	applications	markets	to	support	them,	such	as	mobile	apps,	precision	agriculture,	infrastructure
construction	and	monitoring,	autonomous	vehicles.
In	addition	to	this,	the	EU	and	America	came	to	blows	in	2003	over	the	risks	Galileo	signals	posed	for	GPS	signals
and	whether	they	could	co-exist.	The	EU	managed	to	gain	a	long-term	concession	from	the	United	States	once	it
gained	the	support	of	China.	Should	Britain	develop	its	own	global	navigation	system,	what	restrictions	would	the	EU
and	America	wish	to	impose	on	British	navigation	signals,	as	America	wished	to	do	with	the	EU’s	15	years	ago?
Whatever	Brexit	means	in	space,	the	well-endowed	British	space	economy	will	have	to	work	much	harder	and
smarter	to	maintain	its	competitive	edge	whilst	the	US	and	EU	–	with	their	own	large,	integrated	single	markets	–	aim
to	take	full	advantage	of	the	Second	Space	Age	for	themselves	at	the	expense	of	smaller,	newly-isolated	competitors
like	Britain,	which	will	lose	its	voice	in	the	direct	governance	and	development	of	some	of	the	most	high-quality	and
comprehensive	satellite	infrastructures	in	the	world.
If	Britain	is	to	bargain	for	exemptions	from	Brexit	in	its	space	sector	(to	cherry-pick),	such	as	continuing	its
involvement	in	the	security	aspects	of	Galileo	and	producing	government	communications	satellites	with	the
European	Defence	Agency,	it	raises	difficult	questions	for	the	May	government	on	why	Britain	is	still	contributing	to
EU-controlled	space	budgets	whilst	the	country	voted	to	leave	the	European	Union,	and	whether	leaving	really
means	leaving.
Britain	is	walking	away	from	one	of	the	biggest	platforms	for	being	heard	in	the	vacuum	of	space	–	and	this	should
not	be	ignored	because	transatlantic	space	cooperation	is	never	assured.	Whilst	Britain	increases	its	military	and
intelligence	dependency	on	the	United	States	by	leaving	the	EU,	and	its	access	to	the	EU’s	space	security	data	and
services,	it	will	have	to	forge	its	own	path	to	navigate	the	commercial	opportunities	and	threats	in	the	Second	Space
Age.
___________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	the	British	Journal	of	Politics	and	International	Relations.
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